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Abstract: The recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver 
services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. 
This paper discusses consumer financial regulation, emphasizing the full range of arguments for 
regulation that derive from market failure and from limited consumer rationality in financial 
decision making. We present three case studies—of mortgage markets, payday lending, and 
financing retirement consumption—to illustrate the need for, and limits of, regulation. We argue 
that if regulation is to be beneficial, it must be tailored to specific problems and must be 
accompanied by research to measure the effectiveness of regulatory interventions. 
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  Over the past 65 years, financial innovation has presented U.S. households with an ever-
widening set of financial options from an expanding set of firms and accompanied by a 
sometimes dizzying amount of information. At the same time, consumer finance has increasingly 
become a “do-it-yourself” activity (Ryan, Trumbull, and Tufano, 2010). Households are 
expected to make decisions about pension plan contributions and payouts, to choose from a wide 
array of credit instruments to fund everything from home purchase to short-term cash needs, and 
more generally to assume a greater level of responsibility for their financial well-being.  
 
   This greater consumer autonomy with respect to more, and more important, financial 
decisions poses special public policy concerns in light of the mounting evidence that consumers 
do not always behave as time-consistent, rational utility maximizers. For example, many 
consumers appear to have present-biased preferences, which lead them to favor present 
consumption, although they would display greater patience if they could commit to a plan of 
savings and future consumption. Some consumers may lack the cognitive capacity to optimize 
their financial situation even if presented with all the information that in principle is required to 
do so.  
 
  Such biases and cognitive limitations may be particularly important in the financial 
context because learning from experience in major financial decisions is difficult. Many financial 
decisions like choosing a mortgage or investing in a retirement account are undertaken only 
infrequently. Moreover, the outcomes of these decisions are delayed, perhaps for decades, and 
are subject to large random shocks, so that personal experience is slow to accumulate and is 
contaminated by noise. It can also be difficult to learn about financial decisions from the 
experiences of others. Financial shocks are often correlated across individuals, so that averaging 
the experience of neighbors or acquaintances may not eliminate noise. The rapid pace of 
financial innovation reduces the relevance of older cohorts’ experiences. Social taboos on 
discussing personal finances further reduce the effectiveness of social learning (Zelizer, 1994).  
 
  In the next section, we argue that these considerations provide a rationale for consumer 
financial protection that goes beyond the standard market failures, both because unregulated 
financial markets may be inefficient and because they may generate undesirable distributional 
outcomes. We then use three case studies—of mortgage choice, payday lending, and retirement 
saving—to explore these issues. Finally, skepticism about consumers’ ability to understand and 
use financial products is an important motivation for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
authorized in legislation passed in summer 2010. We conclude by proposing an agenda for the 
new bureau, taking into account some potential limits to its regulatory effectiveness.  
 
The Case for Consumer Financial Regulation 
 
Standard neoclassical analysis provides a taxonomy of market failures related to market 
structure and the incentives of market participants. These traditional failures—externalities, 
information asymmetries, market power, and coordination failures like those that arise with 
public goods—can all be applied to consumer financial markets. 
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  For example, positive externalities from human capital accumulation and home 
ownership have been used to justify government subsidies to student loans and home mortgages. 
Conversely, foreclosures have social costs that are not taken into account by mortgage borrowers 
and lenders. Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (forthcoming) present evidence that foreclosures 
lower the prices of nearby houses and suggest that the transmission mechanism may be 
vandalism or neighborhood deterioration. Such negative externalities can be the starting point for 
a case for policy interventions to reduce the incidence of foreclosures.  
 
  Consumer financial markets provide the textbook case of market failure due to 
information asymmetries: the underprovision of insurance due to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Regulatory responses to this type of market failure include mandating the purchase of 
insurance, public provision to mitigate adverse selection, and subsidizing private insurance 
through the tax code. Information failures have also been implicated in the underprovision of 
consumer credit.  
 
  One feature of many retail markets is price dispersion, which can be sustained by the 
existence of search costs that make some consumers willing to pay higher prices than they might 
find elsewhere. These search costs give retailers a degree of market power, allowing them to 
charge prices above marginal cost. One example in the financial arena is the wide range of fees 
charged for nearly identical stock market index funds based on the Standard and Poor’s 500 
index (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). Policy responses include standardized or centralized 
information provision to reduce search costs, or direct price regulation.  
 
  More generally, making sensible decisions about financial products often requires 
considerable information on terms and conditions, not just prices. This is especially true for 
financial decisions that are undertaken only infrequently. But in many cases, consumers cannot 
efficiently generate information on their own, and the joint production of such information with 
other consumers, with its public good characteristics, is not easily coordinated. Often the 
financial provider will be the most efficient supplier of information, which creates an additional 
rationale for mandates that firms produce and disseminate certain types of information.  
 
  Even with disclosure rules in place, lack of trust is a problem that may lead consumers to 
avoid the use of certain financial products altogether (Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2010; Cole 
and Shastry, 2009; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008). Since lack of financial market 
participation can be a serious mistake, there is a case for regulation to improve consumer trust 
through restrictions on insider trading and suitability and fiduciary requirements. There is 
evidence that mutual fund markets with stronger levels of investor protection are larger than 
those with lower levels of protection (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano, 2009), perhaps working 
through this channel of trust.  
 
In addition to these traditional market failures, research in behavioral economics has highlighted 
the potential for inefficient market outcomes that result from consumers’ biases and cognitive 
limitations. A leading example is the case of present-biased preferences, which can lead an 
individual to make a decision today that reduces future welfare in a way that the individual later 
regrets (Strotz, 1955; Laibson, 1997). This situation in which a present decision creates negative 
future consequences is sometimes referred to as an “internality.” Present-biased preferences have   4
been used to explain behaviors as diverse as failing to save for retirement and smoking. Possible 
policy responses to such preferences are to constrain the present self from taking actions that 
would be too detrimental to the future self, for example, by limiting early access to retirement 
savings or taxing the sale of cigarettes.  
 
  Recent research has documented a pervasive lack of basic financial literacy, an example 
of a cognitive limitation (for example, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007; Lusardi, Mitchell, and 
Curto, 2010; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). Table 1 lists a short set of financial literacy questions 
first added to the Health and Retirement Study in 2004 and subsequently incorporated into 
several other national and international surveys. Among the older Health and Retirement Study 
Respondents, only 56 percent correctly answer both the first two questions, and only 24 percent 
get all three questions correct (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). The younger respondents in the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth fare even worse, with only 46 percent answering both the 
first two questions correctly and 27 percent getting all three questions right (Lusardi, Mitchell, 
and Curto, 2010).  
 
  A lack of financial knowledge need not be problematic if, as Milton Friedman (1953) 
suggested, consumers learn to behave optimally through trial and error, much as a pool player 
need not have any knowledge of physics in order to play pool well. But there is growing 
evidence that consumers make avoidable financial mistakes with nontrivial financial 
consequences (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson, 2009; Bar- Gill and Warren, 2008; 
Campbell, 2006; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, forthcoming). Moreover, these mistakes are more 
common among consumers with lower levels of education and income (Calvet, Campbell, and 
Sodini, 2007, 2009) and lower financial literacy (Kimball and Shumway, 2007). There is some 
evidence that consumers who perform better on cognitive tests make better financial decisions in 
laboratory experiments (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2006) and earn higher returns on their 
equity portfolios later in life (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2009).  
 
  Even if consumers cannot maximize their own welfare, regulators may not necessarily do 
better. But in certain cases, outcomes may be improved by regulations on market conduct that 
reflect the presumed judgment of what most consumers would want, were they fully informed 
and well advised. This logic underpins the rationale for “libertarian paternalism” or “nudges,” 
discussed at length by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), as well as more heavy-handed forms of 
government intervention.  
 
  Consumers’ behavioral biases and cognitive limitations may also change the optimal 
response to traditional market failures. Traditional failures are often addressed by information 
provision or disclosure: to mitigate asymmetric information, to reduce search costs and limit 
market power, and to remedy the underprovision of a public good. But mandated information 
provision may be an ineffective remedy if consumers either do not understand the information or 
believe that it is not relevant to their decisionmaking. For example, if consumers mistakenly 
believe that they will pay their credit bill on time every month, clear and transparent disclosure 
of late fees and interest rates may not change behavior because consumers deem the information 
irrelevant at the time they make a purchase.  
   5
  The functioning of consumer financial markets may also have distributional implications. 
For example, consumers may choose a bank account with “free” checking, underestimating the 
extent to which they will pay penalty fees for overdrawing their accounts in the future. However, 
banks then compete away the excess profits they obtain from overdraft fees by keeping base 
charges low on checking accounts. This implies that naïve consumers cross-subsidize 
sophisticated consumers who don’t overdraw their accounts. Products that allocate costs more 
equally across naïve and sophisticated consumers cannot be successfully brought to market as 
sophisticated consumers find it attractive to retain the cross-subsidies embedded in existing 
products. Nor is it profitable for firms to educate naïve consumers, because educated consumers 
become sophisticated and then demand fewer high-cost financial services. This “shrouded 
equilibrium” has been modeled by Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Campbell (2006) presents 
evidence that similar phenomena are important in mortgage markets. Naïve consumers are likely 
to have less cognitive ability and financial experience—and lower income—than other 
consumers. As a result of dynamics like these, people with lower incomes may systematically 
end up in the segments of the market where financial charges are highest.  
 
Case Study: Choosing a Mortgage 
 
  A great variety of mortgages are available, some of which are complex and pose risks 
that are difficult even for financial professionals to thoroughly understand. Mortgage costs 
appear in a number of forms, not all of which are straightforward to measure. Households take 
out mortgages relatively infrequently, and often negotiate them at the same time that they are 
undergoing a major life transition by moving homes. Under these circumstances, households 
may well fail to make optimal decisions.  
 
  One rationale for government policy in this area is to make information on mortgages 
available, comparable, and comprehensible. A second rationale is to encourage contractual terms 
for mortgages that are less likely to cause later regret by buyers who are often present-oriented 
and have limited financial literacy. A third rationale for government mortgage policy is a public 
interest in reducing the incidence of foreclosures, which, as we mentioned reduce not only the 
value of foreclosed properties, but also the prices of neighboring properties (Campbell, Giglio, 
and Pathak, forthcoming). The negative effect on the neighborhood is an externality that will not 
be taken into account by private lenders even if their foreclosure decisions are privately optimal. 
A final rationale for government policy in this area is that a wave of foreclosures resulting from 
house price declines and unfavorable credit market conditions can contribute to macroeconomic 
instability, as suggested by the U.S. experience during both the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the Great Recession of 2007–2009.  
 
  In the late 1920s, the dominant mortgage form was a short-term balloon loan that 
required frequent refinancing. Low house prices and reduced bank lending capacity in the early 
1930s prevented many homeowners from refinancing, causing a wave of foreclosures that 
exacerbated the Depression. Since then, the dominant mortgage form in the U.S. has been a long-
term amortizing mortgage with a fixed nominal interest rate. This type of mortgage, unusual in 
other countries, has been fostered by implicit public subsidies through government-sponsored 
entities, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
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  The fixed-rate mortgage has some important advantages. The predictability of nominal 
payments simplifies the household’s financial planning problem, at least when inflation is 
relatively stable. The fixed nominal interest rate means that households are protected against 
rising inflation. On the other side, the mortgage typically has an option to refinance, protecting 
the household against unexpected declines in inflation during the life of the mortgage that would 
otherwise increase the real debt burden.  
 
  However, the fixed-rate mortgage has at least three major problems. First, because 
borrowers with a refinancing option are protected against inflation, inflation can create systemic 
risk for lenders of fixed-rate mortgages. Second, long-term nominal fixed-rate mortgages require 
homeowners to decide when they should refinance. This decision is complex; in fact, it is an 
example of a sophisticated “real options” optimal investment problem. Campbell (2006) presents 
evidence that in the late 1990s and early 2000s many households, particularly poorer and less-
educated ones, paid higher mortgage rates than necessary. In American Housing Survey data, 
12–14 percent of households were paying more than 2 percentage points above the prevailing 
mortgage interest rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s; this figure rose above 25 percent in 
2003 after steep drops in interest rates made refinancing particularly advantageous. Third, 
present-oriented borrowers are tempted to extract home equity by increasing their mortgage 
balance. This temptation exists in all forms of mortgages, but the nominal fixed-rate mortgage, 
with its strong incentive to refinance in an environment of rising house prices and declining 
interest rates, provides frequent opportunities to succumb (Khandani, Lo, and Merton, 2009).  
  
 
  Other types of mortgages can mitigate these problems. For example, an adjustable-rate 
mortgage charges an interest rate that adjusts to variations in market rates and therefore 
indirectly to variations in inflation. Over the lifetime of an adjustable-rate mortgage, the real 
present value of mortgage payments is approximately invariant to inflation. Furthermore, an 
adjustable-rate mortgage normally has a lower interest rate than fixed-rate options, since lenders 
need not charge homeowners the cost of a one-sided bet on inflation. For these reasons, 
Greenspan (2004) famously argued that some U.S. homeowners would benefit by shifting from 
fixed to adjustable-rate mortgages.  
 
  However, even though the present value of mortgage payments is invariant to inflation 
with an adjustable-rate mortgage, the cash flow consequences of changing monthly mortgage 
payments can be material. An increase in inflation necessarily leads to a rise in real payments to 
compensate lenders for the erosion of the real value of their principal. This acceleration in the 
required repayment schedule causes serious problems for households that lack alternative means 
to borrow (Campbell and Cocco, 2003). More generally, variation in required monthly mortgage 
payments complicates the household’s financial planning problem. Bucks and Pence (2008) 
present evidence that households with adjustable-rate mortgages systematically underestimate 
the degree to which their mortgage interest rates can vary over time.
1     
 
                                                 
1 The popularity of adjustable-rate mortgages has varied over time, not only in response to the spread between fixed 
and adjustable interest rates, but also in response to recent rate movements, as if households have an irrational belief 
in mean-reversion of long-term interest rates (Campbell, 2006).   7
  Because adjustable-rate mortgages do not have fixed monthly payments, it is 
comparatively straightforward to set their terms to require lower payments initially. It became 
common in the late 1990s and early 2000s to offer a low initial “teaser rate,” which was 
sometimes fixed for several years in “hybrid” adjustable-rate mortgages. After the initial period, 
many of these mortgages charged much higher interest rates, which made it highly desirable to 
refinance them if at all possible. These mortgages are similar to those that prevailed in the U.S. 
before the Great Depression in that they lead to defaults and foreclosures if refinancing is not 
available. They are also considerably more complex and therefore harder for households to 
evaluate and manage.
2  
 
  Economists have suggested alternative mortgage forms that may be superior to any of 
those observed in the marketplace. For example, a fixed-rate mortgage that automatically 
refinanced with no option for home equity extraction would eliminate discretion over refinancing 
and the temptation to deplete home equity at refinancing dates. A fixed-rate mortgage with 
payments that are indexed to inflation would eliminate the remaining problem of inflation 
sensitivity. Adjustable-rate mortgages could be constructed with level nominal or real payments 
and a principal balance that adjusts to variation in short-term nominal interest rates. Finally, 
mortgages could have principal balances that automatically adjust in the same direction as the 
regional level of house prices, reducing the effect of regional price changes on mortgage 
borrowers’ home equity. (Shiller, 2008).  
 
  If such contracts would be superior to existing mortgage forms, at least for certain groups 
of home-buyers, why do they not appear in the marketplace? As discussed earlier, in a mortgage 
market in which some households are present-oriented and cognitively challenged, financial 
innovators may have only weak incentives to design and market new products that can only be 
evaluated by sophisticated households. Instead, innovators may design superficially attractive 
products that cater to household behavioral biases. Some households will take out conventional 
fixed-rate mortgages without anticipating that they will fail to refinance them optimally and thus 
will pay higher mortgage rates than they need to when interest rates decline. Sophisticated 
households who do know how to refinance their mortgages will find conventional fixed-rate 
mortgages attractively cheap because they benefit from a cross-subsidy from naïve households. 
Sophisticated households will not perceive any benefit from an automatically refinancing fixed-
rate mortgage, and financial entrepreneurs offering such a product will not be able to win 
customers either by advertising to sophisticated households or by educating naïve households to 
become sophisticated.  
  
  There are several ways in which consumer financial regulation might help improve 
mortgage contracts. Most obviously, disclosure requirements can facilitate risk comparison 
across mortgage forms. In this regard, it is key to offer households measures of risk as well as 
expected cost. Standard calculations of interest rates using annual percentage rates are helpful for 
                                                 
2 Miles (2003) presents evidence that households in the United Kingdom, where mortgages with adjustable teaser 
rates are standard, failed to manage them properly in the early 2000s. He shows that almost one-third of U.K. 
households were paying a higher rate than they could get by taking out a new adjustable rate mortgage. Similarly, it 
has been claimed that many U.S. households took out complex subprime mortgages during the credit boom of the 
2000s even though they would have qualified for cheaper prime mortgages (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2004; Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz, 2009).   8
comparing mortgages with similar risks, but not for comparing fixed- and adjustable-rate 
mortgages, nor for comparing adjustable-rate mortgages with different initial fixed-rate periods, 
interest rate caps, and other complex features. Both the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development have recently augmented disclosure 
requirements surrounding mortgage originations.  
 
  A related approach would be to focus on the mortgage brokers, who are often providing 
information to potential borrowers. In 2008, Congress passed the Safe Mortgage Licensing Act 
with the goal of establishing minimum state standards for licensing mortgage originators. A more 
drastic approach would be to establish a fiduciary duty for mortgage brokers—that is, a legal 
duty that they use their best judgment in acting in the best interest of borrowers.  
 
  An alternative regulatory strategy would be to promote a relatively small group of 
standard mortgage choices. The case for doing so is based on the presumption that a relatively 
small number of standard mortgages are a reasonable choice for most households. If these 
mortgages are offered as a “default” option, most households will choose from among them and 
this may reduce the incidence of financial mistakes. The existence of standard mortgages would 
let households concentrate on standard mortgage terms rather than considering a vast array of 
special features. For example, Woodward (2003) presents evidence that households pay lower 
mortgage fees when all fees are rolled into the interest rate, simplifying the task of cost 
comparison. Thaler and Sunstein (2008, Ch. 8) have proposed that mortgage terms be made 
available electronically in standardized form to permit the development of online sites for 
comparison shopping.  
   
  However, designating a preferred group of standard mortgages can have pitfalls, as well. 
In the past, government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac implicitly 
subsidized long-term, nominal fixed-rate mortgages and helped them become de facto standard 
mortgages. One cost of this policy became apparent during the recent financial crisis when the 
government was forced to assume losses incurred by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. If certain 
mortgages are to be favored, it is preferable to do so explicitly: for example, by lowering capital 
requirements on banks holding such mortgages or by requiring consumers to go through 
additional steps to qualify for nonstandard mortgages.
3 Another difficulty with promoting a small 
group of standard mortgages is that, given the problems with existing mortgage contracts, it is 
important not to choke off the development of new and potentially superior mortgages.  
 
  Finally, instead of focusing on helping consumers with their task of choosing a suitable 
mortgage, a complementary approach might focus on regulations that encourage or require 
mortgage modification as an alternative to foreclosure when unexpected circumstances arise. 
Lenders are particularly reluctant to reduce the principal balance on mortgages, in part because 
they find it hard to distinguish cases where this is the efficient outcome from cases where 
borrowers do not need principal reduction or cases where borrowers cannot support even a 
reduced level of mortgage debt. One alternative, discussed by White (2009), would be to rely on 
                                                 
3 The Federal Reserve Board’s 2008 amendments to regulations implementing the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act impose new and stringent underwriting standards for “higher priced mortgage loans” associated with 
the subprime crisis.   9
bankruptcy judges to make this determination by altering the bankruptcy code to allow mortgage 
principal reduction in bankruptcy.  
 
Case Study: Payday Lending 
 
  Payday loans are relatively small-size, short-term, unsecured loans that are often used by 
less well-to-do consumers. Most payday loans follow a standard lending process and take a 
standard form. Consumers visit a storefront location, request a loan, have their employment 
verified, and if approved, walk out minutes later with the loan proceeds. Most transactions are 
small—about 80 percent of loans are for less than $300. Instead of a finance charge that varies 
with the duration of the loan, the standard fee typically ranges from $15 to $30 per $100 
borrowed for approximately a two-week period (Stegman, 2007). In some states, borrowers can 
repay the loan (plus fee) by rolling it over to a new, higher balance loan, while other states limit 
same-store rollovers. Many studies document sizable repeat usage of payday loans, although the 
exact amount varies by study (Elliehausen, 2009; Stegman and Farris, 2003; Parrish, 2008; 
Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008; Flannery and Samolyk, 2005). The volume of payday loans is 
roughly $40 billion per year. For a review of this industry, see Stegman (2007) in this journal 
and the pioneering work of Caskey (1994, 2001, 2002).  
 
  Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find that payday loan customers tend to have a 
moderate level of education, are under age 45, and have children. Most are from lower and 
middle-income households with limited liquid assets (Elliehausen, 2009). Many have been 
denied credit in the past 12 months, have credit cards at the limit, have concerns about their 
ability to access credit, and are less likely to have home equity to tap (Elliehausen and Lawrence, 
2001; Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008). Those who use payday loans are also more likely to use 
other forms of high-cost credit (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009).  
 
  There are almost 24,000 payday loan outlets nationally, but the industry is not 
particularly concentrated, with the largest six companies accounting for 20 percent of the market. 
The few studies on business profitability suggest that payday lending is not extraordinarily 
profitable, due to high operating costs (Flannery and Samolyk, 2005; Tufano and Ryan, 2009; 
Huckstep, 2007; Skiba and Tobacman, 2007).  
 
   Traditional market failures seem an unlikely basis for regulation of payday loans. There 
is little evidence of market power or abnormal profits.
4 In some low-income communities, the 
number of payday loan outlets far exceeds the number of banks and even fast food restaurants 
(Morse, 2009), and they are more prevalent in less-banked communities (Graves, 2003). There 
don’t appear to be asymmetries of information, with lenders knowing more than borrowers, nor 
material nonpublic information that might justify regulation.  
  
  There is mixed evidence on whether payday loans help or harm users. For example, 
Morse (2009) finds that households facing natural disasters were less likely to experience 
foreclosures (or larcenies) when payday loans were more accessible. Wilson, Findlay, Meehan, 
                                                 
4 Mann and Hawkins (2007) argue that the most convenient locations for customers are more expensive, which may 
privilege established firms and “hinder the effectiveness of price competition.”   10
Wellford, and Schurter (2010) replicate this finding with a laboratory experiment. Some 
evidence from states that shut down payday lending through rate caps shows that restricting 
access to payday loans causes deterioration in the overall financial condition of households 
(Zinman, 2008; Morgan and Strain, 2008).  
 
  Despite this positive evidence, there is also a body of work suggesting that payday loans 
may harm users. Melzer (forthcoming) finds that access to payday loans is related to increased 
difficulty paying mortgage, rent, and utility bills; a higher rate of moving out of one’s home due 
to financial difficulties; and delayed medical care, dental care, and prescription drug purchases. 
Skiba and Tobacman (2009) conclude that loan approval for first-time payday loan applicants 
increases the likelihood of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. (Conversely, Stoianovici, and Maloney, find 
no relationship between these loans and bankruptcy filings.) Campbell, Martinez-Jerez, and 
Tufano (2008) find fewer involuntary bank account closures due to overdrafts after Georgia 
banned payday lending. For military personnel, payday loans are associated with declines in 
overall job performance and lower levels of retention (Carrell and Zinman, 2008). Indeed, to 
discourage payday loans to military personnel, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act 
caps the fees on payday loans to service members at a 36 percent annual percentage rate.  
 
  Those who are concerned about payday loans emphasize that they seem designed to 
exploit both the cognitive limitations and present-biased preferences of certain borrowers. 
Lusardi and Tufano (2009) document that payday loan borrowers and users of other forms of 
nontraditional credit have low levels of debt literacy (as measured by their understanding of 
interest compounding). Bertrand and Morse (2009) find that about 40 percent of payday loan 
borrowers claim that their annual percentage rate is around 15 percent, apparently confusing the 
cash charge per hundred dollars and an annual interest rate. Some payday loan borrowers use this 
form of high-cost borrowing even though they have access to lower-cost credit in the form of 
unused credit card borrowing capacity (Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman, 2009) or savings and 
checking account balances (Carter, Skiba, and Tobacman, 2010). Finally, the substantial 
evidence of repeat or chronic payday borrowing could reflect present-biased preferences. Critics 
emphasize that payday loans have undesirable distributional consequences because they are used 
disproportionately by less well-off individuals and racial minorities (Graves, 2003; Stegman and 
Faris, 2003).  
 
  However, defenders of payday loans point out that many sources of short-term credit 
have very high annual percentage rates, including overdraft protection on a checking account, 
returned check fees, and credit card late fees (Consumer Reports, 2005; Lehman, 2005). They 
argue that the costs of not having access to credit can be extraordinarily high. For example, if 
electricity or telephone service is shut off, the time and expense to restart service can far exceed 
a payday loan fee (Community Financial Services Association of America, 2006).  
 
  Taking these arguments and evidence together, it seems likely that payday loans benefit 
some consumers and harm others. Used “responsibly” as an alternative to even higher-cost 
borrowing or the failure to pay certain bills, payday loans are likely beneficial. But when used 
repeatedly, they may lead to ballooning debt and ever-deepening financial distress.  
   11
  Given these uncertainties about the practice of payday lending, it is perhaps not 
surprising that regulation has been somewhat helter-skelter. At the federal level, banking 
authorities took a series of steps starting in 2000 to discourage federally insured depository 
institutions from participating in payday lending (Smale, 2005). As a result, payday lending is 
largely conducted and regulated at the state level (Peterson, 2008). Georgia prohibits payday 
lending entirely, and nine other states effectively prohibit it with interest rate caps that make it 
unprofitable. The Truth-in-Lending Act requires that the loan amount, finance charges, and 
annual percentage rate must be clearly disclosed in any contract or agreement the borrower signs. 
Thirty states require payday lenders to clearly and prominently post annual percentage rates and 
fee schedules, although critics argue that these notices are frequently not posted (Fox and 
Woodhall, 2006). Many states limit the maximum amount of a payday loan, and some states 
prohibit rollover loans. Thus, the range of regulatory practices extend from outright or de facto 
bans, to disclosure requirements, with a middle ground of restrictions on contract terms or 
business practices like repeat usage.  
 
  From a policy design perspective, regulation of payday loans should address how the 
product is used by the borrower and what alternatives will arise if such loans are restricted. One 
possibility is that payday loans are used because of behavioral considerations like present-
minded bias and financial illiteracy. In this case, addressing these issues would help people avoid 
making a choice they may later regret. If payday loans are an impulse item, then a short “cooling 
off” period might give people time to consider whether they really want a loan, although the 
evidence suggests that a few days’ wait has not dampened the demand for tax refund anticipation 
loans (Cole, Thompson, and Tufano, 2008). If payday loans result from financial illiteracy, then 
well-designed disclosure may help consumers make better decisions. A recent experiment by 
Bertrand and Morse (2009) found that fee disclosure in dollar terms was more effective in 
reducing same-store payday loan demand than describing fees in terms of annual percentage 
rates or in other ways, but the absolute reduction in subsequent borrowing was modest. Overall, 
these results raise questions about the form and efficacy of disclosure.
5 If, however, payday loans 
are used primarily by individuals who are unable to match their income to surges in their 
spending needs, then barring rollovers of payday loans—or banning the loans themselves—
won’t address the need that gives rise to the product.  
 
  While regulation should be designed to protect consumers, it must also be cognizant of 
business realities. For example, consider a policy that would cap payday loan interest rates at a 
36 percent annual percentage rate.
6 For a $300 two-week loan, a 36 percent annual interest rate 
cap would limit the lender’s total revenue to $4.15 (300 × 0.36/26). But average losses are $5.72 
per payday loan, before accounting for the cost of wages, buildings, advertising, or overhead 
(Flannery and Samolyk, 2005). Thus, a 36 percent interest rate ceiling might not create 
“affordable” payday loans but might simply lead to the exit of existing vendors. More generally, 
                                                 
5 In a similar vein, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) and Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (forthcoming) find 
that current mutual fund fee disclosures generally have little effect. Hastings and Tajeda-Ashton (2008) find that 
disclosing fees in dollar terms, rather than percentages, is more effective in changing behavior. 
6 Federal legislation that was pending in 2010—H.R.1608 in the House of Representatives and S.500 in the Senate—
would have set such a limit.   12
rate caps could lead to new products or practices that skirt the rules or lead consumers to seek 
other, possibly even less-attractive, sources of short-term credit.  
 
  A different regulatory approach would be to encourage alternatives to payday loans. 
Before she assumed her role as chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, then-
academic Sheila Bair (2005) reviewed alternative models and called for regulatory 
encouragement of low-cost, short-term loans. At the FDIC, she launched a pilot program to 
advance these products, although the results so far are limited. To investigate the range of 
possible payday loan proposals and how to encourage alternatives, having academics evaluate 
each program independently seems unlikely to be efficient. Instead, it would be useful if some of 
the research was carried out by policymakers themselves, albeit independently. This type of 
activity could be carried out by the research group of the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.  
 
Case Study: Financing Consumption in Retirement 
  
  The process of accumulating wealth for retirement when young and transforming that 
wealth into consumption when older involves long-term financial commitments that are large 
and consequential for most households. In the United States, the three largest financial resources 
of the elderly are Social Security, home equity, and the value of employer-provided pension or 
retirement savings account balances. In this journal, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010) 
report that at the median, Social Security accounts for 40 percent of the wealth of households 
approaching retirement, housing accounts for 22 percent, and pensions/retirement savings plans 
account for 20 percent.  
 
  Here, we focus our discussion on consumer financial decisions and policies related to this 
last category of pensions and retirement savings plans, which are mediated through employers. 
In the United States, employer involvement in financing retirement consumption is largely 
motivated by provisions in the federal tax code that exclude from taxable income both employee 
and employer contributions to employer-sponsored pension and retirement savings plans. There 
is some rationale for subsidizing employer involvement in this market because employers are in 
a unique position to help solve some of the problems that might otherwise lead to market failure. 
For example, employers may reduce search costs for employees by vetting financial providers; 
they may mitigate adverse selection by pooling individuals into employee groups; and they may 
alleviate problems that arise due to limited cognition or lack of financial literacy by acting as an 
agent on behalf of their employees. Employers may also negotiate better terms with financial 
providers than employees could obtain individually.  
 
  Employer-sponsored retirement plans broadly come in two forms. In a “defined benefit” 
plan, employees accumulate a claim to a certain level of pension benefits based on a formula that 
takes into account years with their employer and their pay level at the time of retirement. In a 
defined benefit plan, employees have few choices to make: the employer determines the benefits 
to be paid in retirement and makes the contribution and investment choices necessary to make 
good on the promised benefits. In a “defined contribution” plan, employees contribute a certain 
amount to a personal retirement account like a 401(k), perhaps matched by an employer 
contribution. In a typical defined contribution plan, employees face many choices: whether or   13
how much to contribute, how to invest their account balances, and at what rate to withdraw their 
accumulations at retirement. 
 
  The prevalence of defined benefit and defined contribution plans has changed 
significantly over time in a way that demonstrates the potential for government regulation to 
shape markets in dramatic ways—sometimes intended, sometimes not. In 1975, participants in 
employer-sponsored defined benefit pension plans outnumbered participants in defined 
contribution plans by 2.4 to 1. This situation began to change in the 1980s, precipitated by a 
series of laws and regulations. The first, the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 
1974 (or ERISA), was intended to protect current and former employees and their beneficiaries 
from employer abuses such as the underfunding of promised pension benefits or onerous vesting 
requirements. ERISA was followed in 1978 by the addition of section 401(k) to the Internal 
Revenue Code. A subsequent clarification in 1981 allowed employers to exclude employer and 
employee 401(k) contributions from taxable income. The 401(k) plan was originally envisioned 
as a savings vehicle to supplement, not supplant, traditional defined benefit pension plans. But 
given the higher costs and regulatory restrictions imposed on defined benefit plans following 
ERISA, the 401(k) plan quickly became an attractive substitute for employers. By 2007, defined 
contribution participants outnumbered defined benefit participants by 3.4 to 1, a striking and 
completely unanticipated reversal from three decades earlier (Department of Labor, 2008, 2010).  
 
  From an employee’s perspective, a defined contribution plan has a number of attractive 
features relative to a defined benefit plan: flexibility in the amount of current compensation 
deferred to the future, portability across jobs, and reduced risk that an employer will underfund 
or mismanage plan assets resulting in an inability to fund promised payments. But defined 
contribution plans have drawbacks as well, foremost being the number of decisions required of 
savings plan participants. A growing body of evidence suggests that present-biased preferences 
and cognitive limitations shape participant choices in ways that may give rise to inefficiencies.  
 
  For example, one set of studies compares plans in which the default is that employees are 
out of the plan but can decide to opt in, with plans in which the default is to be in the plan but 
employees can decide to opt out. Because the costs of opting in or opting out are small, standard 
economic theory predicts that the default option should have little effect on savings plan 
participation. But participation in defined contribution plans is in fact heavily influenced by the 
default (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2006; Carroll, Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2009). Similarly, contribution rates and asset allocation 
outcomes are also significantly influenced by employer defaults (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; 
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2005 and 2009). Many savings plan participants never rebalance 
their portfolios in response to changes in the relative value of different assets (Ameriks and 
Zeldes, 2004; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi, 2006). When employees do actively 
choose their asset allocation or their contribution rate, their choices are heavily influenced by 
recent trends (Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2004, 2009) and the 
structure of the investment menu, like the number of choices offered (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; 
Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, 2007).  
 
  Concern that consumers were making suboptimal choices about their defined contribution 
plans motivated several key provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the biggest   14
regulatory reform of pensions and retirement savings plans since ERISA. This legislation 
includes inducements for employers to structure their savings plans to incorporate automatic 
enrollment, automatic contribution escalation, and a diversified default asset allocation. These 
plan features help circumvent the tendency for employees with present-biased preferences to 
delay participating in an employer-sponsored savings plan or to choose a contribution rate that 
may be too low.  
 
  Since the passage of the act, the fraction of plans with these features has increased 
significantly. For example, Fidelity Investments (2009), the largest 401(k) plan administrator in 
the United States, reported a 70 percent increase in the fraction of its sponsors offering automatic 
enrollment between 2007 and 2009. By 2009, nearly half of its participants were in plans with 
automatic enrollment. Fidelity also reports that nearly all (96 percent) of its automatic enrollment 
plans now use “target date funds” as their default investment option, a fund category that 
includes a mix of domestic and international equities, bonds, and short-term securities with 
allocation between these asset classes changing over time as investors approach retirement. 
Previously, the default investment funds chosen by employers were predominantly money 
market or “stable value” funds. Whether these provisions of the Pension Protection Act improve 
long-run retirement security remains to be seen. For example, it is possible that increased savings 
in defined contribution savings plans will crowd out savings in other areas or be offset by 
increasing consumer debt. But recent evidence on savings-related crowd-out suggests that it is 
largely confined to higher-income households (Engelhardt and Kumar, forthcoming).  
 
  Some have argued that these concerns about defined contribution savings plans are severe 
enough that the appropriate response is to scrap the current system in favor of mandatory savings 
schemes (Ghilarducci, 2008). Others would prefer a greater emphasis on defined benefit pension 
plans. However, much of the focus has been on what further regulation might be desirable within 
the current defined contribution system.  
 
  First, not all employers offer retirement savings plans. Thus, one set of proposals would 
expand access to workplace-based savings plans (Iwry and John, 2009). Second, few individuals 
annuitize any part of their defined contribution account balances at retirement, even though most 
economic models suggest that they should at least partially annuitize. This “annuity puzzle” is 
not restricted to defined contribution participants—an increasing fraction of defined benefit 
pension beneficiaries are opting to take a lump sum at the time of retirement rather than the 
traditional annuity. Tax incentives or mandates could lead to greater annuitization. Third, many 
employees appear overly invested in the stock of their employer: within publicly traded firms; 56 
percent of 401(k) plans offer employer stock as an investment option, 53 percent of participants 
in these plans invest some of their assets in employer stock, and 10 percent of participants 
allocate more than half of their balances to employer stock (Holden, VanDerhei, and Alonso, 
2009). But too heavy an emphasis on employer stock means a lack of diversification not only 
within the investment portfolio, but also because returns on employer stock are correlated with 
the returns on labor income. Finally, some investment options that might make sense for 
retirement savings, notably longer-term investments that carry a premium because they are not 
liquid in the short run, are not typically available in defined contribution savings plans because 
these investments are not amenable to daily valuation. These problems suggest the need for   15
regulations that better align investment options for defined contribution plans with investor 
needs.  
 
Conclusion: An Agenda for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
  The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 that was signed into law 
in July 2010 authorizes the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to safeguard 
consumer interests in many financial markets.
7 Administratively, the new bureau will be located 
inside the Federal Reserve, but it will have independence from the normal Fed decision 
processes in setting rules and bringing enforcement actions. The mandate of the new bureau is 
still taking shape, but it will focus primarily on issues affecting consumer borrowing, whether 
that happens through mortgages, bank loans, credit cards, or payday lending—as well as on 
payment services and some forms of savings. The bureau is not authorized to address issues 
involving auto lending, securities investments, pensions and other employee fringe benefits, or 
insurance, although the bureau does have broad latitude to undertake research related to 
consumer finance and financial literacy.  
 
  In this paper, we have described a number of rationales for consumer financial regulation. 
Given what we know about market failures in consumer finance, both traditional and behavioral, 
what should be the agenda of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?  
 
  A natural focus of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will be the provision of 
adequate information to consumers. We believe this is the right starting point. However, it will 
be important to keep in mind how consumers actually use information to make decisions: 
disclosure needs to be both salient and easy to understand. Traditional disclosure policies, such 
as the requirement of the Truth in Lending Act that the costs of credit should be reported in the 
form of annual percentage rates, are often better adapted to how economists or lawyers think 
than to consumers’ natural habits of mind.  
 
  In some cases, disclosures can be improved by customizing them to reflect average 
consumer experience. For example, banks might be required to report the cost of a bank account 
given the average number of overdrafts or other fee-generating actions that customers with these 
accounts have taken. Such augmented disclosure could even be made conditional on relevant 
characteristics of particular households.  
 
  The new agency should monitor the effectiveness of disclosures, not only in improving 
consumer understanding, but also in reducing the actual costs consumers pay for financial 
products and in improving their financial well-being. If disclosures are only weakly effective, 
then the bureau can consider more intrusive regulation, for example by requiring an explicit opt-
in for features of financial products that appear difficult to understand, or by requiring consumers 
to qualify for these features or even banning them altogether.
8  
                                                 
7 The creation of a specialized consumer financial protection agency follows a proposal initially put forward in 
Warren (2007). 
8 We present a more complete review of possible forms of regulatory intervention in Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, 
and Tufano (2010).   16
 
  As the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau develops its agenda, it will be important to 
keep in mind several limitations on the ability of regulation to improve financial outcomes for 
consumers.  
 
  First, while regulation should be primarily attuned to consumers, the bureau should be 
keenly aware of the economics of consumer financial markets. For example, many products 
involve large customer-acquisition, set-up, or processing costs that are fixed for each customer, 
as well as marginal costs that vary with the scale of the customer’s financial activity. As a result, 
consumer financial products characterized by small transactions relative to fixed costs are 
relatively expensive to provide (Schneider and Tufano, 2007). In the market for short-term 
consumer credit, for example, small loans will be costly to service unless they are organized 
through long-term relationships that allow firms to amortize their fixed costs over many related 
transactions. But the pricing for most savings, investing, and borrowing products is largely based 
on variable elements (like expense ratios on mutual funds or annual percentage rates on loans). 
With single-part pricing schemes, ceilings on interest rates or charges can have the unintended 
effect of foreclosing the market for smaller accounts. Regulators need to understand, and perhaps 
even encourage, two-part pricing schemes. Furthermore, if policymakers seek to expand 
consumer access to certain markets, regulations that help firms lower the costs of acquiring and 
servicing customers could be helpful.  
 
  Second, because consumers of financial products can be very different, regulators should 
be cautious about imposing “one size fits all” solutions. For example, a homebuyer who expects 
to move in the near future might decide against a long-term, nominal fixed-rate mortgage and 
instead choose a mortgage where the interest rate is fixed for only a few years. Similarly, a 
blanket ban on payday loans might benefit some consumers, while injuring others.  
 
  Third, regulation should seek to allow, and indeed encourage, financial innovation. In the 
market for retirement savings products, for example, current investment solutions lack any 
mechanism for giving consumers access to less-liquid asset classes that might earn them an 
illiquidity premium. As noted earlier, economists have suggested several innovative types of 
mortgages that might improve upon existing products.  
 
  Fourth, regulators must be aware that financial innovation will circumvent clumsily 
designed or costly regulations. The fragmented structure of the U.S. system of financial oversight 
and the capacity of firms to use different legal forms to provide similar financial services create 
many opportunities for regulatory arbitrage (Jackson, 1999). A leading example is the 1974 
reform of defined benefit pensions which inadvertently encouraged the growth of defined 
contribution retirement savings plans. As noted earlier, defined contribution plans have certain 
advantages, like greater portability as employees move from one job to the next; but they also 
impose a more substantial burden on households to self-manage their retirement savings. It is not 
clear that the current U.S. system of financing retirement consumption is optimally structured. In 
the case of payday lenders, the decision of regulators to exclude federally insured depository 
institutions from participating in payday lending may have served largely to move that activity to 
smaller, local firms that are both less efficient and more difficult to supervise.  
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  Finally, all regulation is subject to the political process, which can easily capture 
regulation. For example, politicians’ desire to extend credit access to lower-income households 
was a contributing factor in the development of the subprime mortgage market, the recent 
housing and credit bubbles, and ultimately the financial crisis of 2007–09.  
 
  Given these potential problems, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should 
follow a disciplined process when considering new financial regulations. First, identify specific 
problems. Second, design metrics for success in addressing these problems. For example, if the 
problem is wide dispersion in the fees that consumers pay for extremely similar products such as 
index mutual funds, metrics for success could include an increase in consumer knowledge of 
available low-cost options or a decrease in both the level and the dispersion of fees that 
consumers actually pay. Third, tailor interventions to the problems at hand. Fourth, evaluate both 
potential and existing regulations to determine whether interventions actually deliver the desired 
improvements in the metrics for success.  
 
  This last step will require a broad array of research methodologies. Some evidence can be 
gathered from aggregate data: for example, in measuring the adequacy of retirement saving from 
statistics on wealth accumulation in 401(k) plans. Other evidence can come from cross-country 
comparisons. There is also an urgent need for improved experimental data on individual 
consumer responses to, and understanding of, new financial products, and for household-level 
field data to reveal cross-sectional variation in financial decisionmaking. Most household-level 
field research uses surveys, such as the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, but 
these surveys have severe limitations including refusals to participate (particularly among the 
wealthy), limited granularity, and inaccurate responses. It will be important to gather accurate 
household-level data from a wide array of financial service providers. Such data will be much 
more useful if they can be merged into a comprehensive package that describes the complete 
financial position of households, and more useful still if they can be linked with survey data on 
households’ beliefs, stated objectives, and financial literacy.  
  
Table 1  
Individual Financial Literacy 
  Health and Retirement  
Study 2004 
(Respondents largely aged 50-69)
National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 2007-2008 
(Respondents aged 23-28) 
 
 
Financial Literacy Question 
 
 
Correct 
 
 
Incorrect 
Don’t 
know 
or refused 
 
 
Correct 
 
 
Incorrect 
Don’t 
know 
or refused 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest 
rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think 
you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: 
more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102? 
67.1 22.2  10.7 79.5 14.6  5.7 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 
1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, 
would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or 
less than today with the money in this account? 
75.2 13.4  10.4 54.0 30.7  15.1 
Do you think that the following statement is true or false? 
“Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer 
return than a stock mutual fund.” 
52.3 13.2  34.6 46.8 15.8  37.3 
Source: Columns 1-3, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006); Columns 4-6, Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2010) 
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